2021 Charter Amendments

Proposal No. 6 - 2021 DPCA Vote Allocation Amendment

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NON-DPCA Voting Supporters: Orlando Vidal (United Arab Emirates)

Purpose: To remedy a lack of meaningful and motivational distinctions between small to medium sized country committees and an overly complex vote allocation system, by making the allocation process simpler and clearer, and thereby increasing representation.

As a result of this change the organization would see the following benefits:

- Approximately 80% of country committees will see an increase of one (1) in their voting representatives.
- Every country committee regardless of its size will have 2 DPCA votes, as mandated by the bylaw 3.6 (d).
- The need to invent DPCA votes beyond the initial product will be reduced or eliminated.
- Perhaps most importantly, this solution would create meaningful and motivational distinctions between small to medium sized country committees that would have 2 to 5 DPCA votes WITHOUT meaningfully impacting those at the higher end of the distribution.

This outcome would be consistent with the aforementioned goals of the organization of cultivating new leaders and retaining past leaders. In summary, the overall understanding of the math would be simplified and the distribution equitable.[1]

Affected Sections: Section 3.6(a)

Text:

WHEREAS as an organization, we have among our goals the following:

- The cultivation of a more involved and informed leadership
- A sense that committed leaders of the organization have an ongoing stake in its success and development through continued participation.

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[1] Supporting data related to this proposal and Proposal No. 12 can be found here:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1C0zjJzUKJSN8c8vIXhGQmPwAmO3dNhX_/edit#gid=1290123010

- The development of potential future leaders to increase diversity of representation within the organizational leadership
- The retention of past leaders as a vital resource of institutional memory and of support for new leaders.
- The extension of fair and proportional representation throughout the organization; and

WHEREAS pursuant to these goals the body adopted into section 3.6 (d) of the Charter the requirement that each country committee shall have two (2) whole DPCA votes, allocated to the chair and vice chair. However, it did not at that time update the math that calculates the allocation of DPCA votes. Specifically, section 3.6 (a) of the Charter reads:

(i)   Multiply the number of Country Committees by 4 to obtain the "Initial Product;"

(ii)   25% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees on the basis of one (1) vote each;

(iii)   75% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees proportionally by multiplying with respect to each Country Committee, the Initial Product by the Country Committee's percentage of the total membership of Democrats Abroad. Fractions greater than or equal to 0.455 shall be rounded to the next highest whole number. Fractions less than 0.455 shall be rounded to the next lowest whole number

WHEREAS by doing this in 2021, at the end of an unnecessarily complicated mathematical exercise, involving rounding (established at .455 by the DNC), 11 country committees did not arrive at the minimum of two votes. At the end of the calculation there were 5 unallocated votes, which meant that six more votes had to be added in order to allocate to those 11 country committees the two-vote minimum mandated by section 3.6 (d). Even volunteers with a high degree of knowledge of the process can be confused, which could cause disagreements in the future that reduce productivity and the appearance of fairness.

Therefore, BE IT RESOLVED that the rule in section 3.6 (a) that requires the initial product be determined by multiplying the number of country committees by 4 be amended to require the initial product to be multiplied by 5. As a result of which, 40% of the initial product would be assigned to each country committee on the basis of two votes each, with the remaining 60% allocated proportionally on the basis of voting strength.

Section 3.6(a) of the Democrats Abroad Charter would thus be amended to read:

(i) Multiply the number of Country Committees by 5 to obtain the "Initial Product;" (ii) 40% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees on the basis of two (2) votes each;

(iii) 60% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees proportionally by multiplying with respect to each Country Committee, the Initial Product

by the Country Committee's percentage of verified members to the total verified membership of Democrats Abroad. Fractions greater than or equal to 0.455 shall be rounded to the next highest whole number. Fractions less than 0.455 shall be rounded to the next lowest whole number.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the following language be added to section 3.6(a):

(iv) if due to rounding during proportional allocation there should be remaining votes, they shall be allocated one each to the country committee(s) whose voting strength is closest to the rounding point (.455).

Markup:

Section 3.6 (Representation and Voting)

(a) Representation and votes shall be allocated to Country Committees biennially in odd-numbered years, in accordance with such year's certification required under Section 5.4(f), calculated as follows:

(i) Multiply the number of Country Committees by 4 5 to obtain the "Initial Product;"

(ii) 25 40% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees on the basis of one (1 2) vote each;

(iii) 75 60% of the Initial Product shall be allocated among the Country Committees proportionally by multiplying with respect to each Country Committee, the Initial Product by the Country Committee's percentage of the total verified members hip to the total verified membership of Democrats Abroad. Fractions greater than or equal to 0.455 shall be rounded to the next highest whole number. Fractions less than 0.455 shall be rounded to the next lowest whole number. ;

(iv) if due to rounding during proportional allocation there should be remaining votes, they shall be allocated one each to the country committee(s) whose voting strength is closest to the rounding point (.455).

Supporting Information:

**DPCA Charter Amendment Proposals #6 and #12 on Voting Allocations**

Charts for 2021 Allocation, 5-Vote Multiplier, and 6-Vote Multiplier Comparison

(Note: All Voting Distribution illustrations are based on <u>current 2021</u> Membership Count Data. Actual voting distribution and thresholds will change based on future Membership Count data.)

2021 Current Distribution of Votes among CCs

4 Vote Distribution – 2021 Current

Number of Countries with 2-votes, 3-votes, 4-votes, etc. allocated.

Legend: ■ COUNTA of 2021 Votes — Trendline for COUNTA of 2021 Votes

Chart — # of Countries w/ X-votes (y-axis, 0 to 30) vs # of Votes per CC (x-axis):

| # of Votes per CC	2	3	4	5	6	9	12	15	23
# of Countries	27	11	3	3	3	1	1	1	2

52% of CCs are limited to only 2 votes (Chair & Vice-Chair)
21% of CCs are allocated a single Voting Rep. (3 total votes)
5% of CCs are allocated 2 Voting Reps. (4 total votes)
etc.

Proposed Distribution of Votes under 5-Vote Multiplier

5 Vote Distribution – Proposed

Number of Countries with 2-votes, 3-votes, 4-votes, etc. allocated.

Legend: ■ COUNTA of 5-Vote Multiplier — Trendline for COUNTA of Base 5 Votes

Y-axis: # of Countries w/ X-votes

Values by # of Votes per CC:
- 2: 11
- 3: 16
- 4: 11
- 5: 3
- 6: 3
- 7: 3
- 10: 1
- 13: 1
- 16: 1
- 24: 2

X-axis: # of Votes per CC

21% of CCs are limited to only 2 votes (Chair & Vice-Chair)
30% of CCs are allocated a single Voting Rep. (3 total votes)
21% of CCs are allocated 2 Voting Reps. (4 total votes)
etc.

Proposed Distribution of Votes under 6-Vote Multiplier

6 Vote Distribution – Proposed

Number of Countries with 2-votes, 3-votes, 4-votes, etc. allocated.

■ COUNTA of 6-Vote Multiplier — Trendline for COUNTA of Base 6 Votes

Less than 10% of CCs are now limited to only 2 votes (Chair & Vice-Chair)

34% of CCs are allocated a single Voting Rep. (3 total votes)

21% of CCs are allocated 2 Voting Reps. (4 total votes)

Etc.

Note the much longer "tail" of distribution, with a greater number of medium-sized CCs now receiving additional Voting Reps, with much lower thresholds for being able to achieve an additional Voting Rep.

**Additional Voting Rep Allocation Comparison**
2021 Current vs. 5-Vote Multiplier vs. 6-Vote Multiplier

How many members are needed to reach the next threshold for obtaining an Additional Voting Representative? – A lower membership number threshold makes it more accessible to gain an additional Voting Rep.

Note: This Chart identifies the Additional Voting Reps that will be allocated – in addition to the base votes for a Chair and Vice-Chair.

Membership Threshold for Each Add'l Voting Rep. – 2021 vs. 5-Vote vs. 6-Vote Multi.
How many members are needed before receiving an additional Voting Rep. (based on 2021 memb count)

Data Comparison Table
(Used to create the Chart)

Voting Reps	2021 Dist.	5-Vote Multi.	6-Vote Multi.
1	1600	510	380
2	2700	1600	1200
3	3800	2700	2030
4	4890	3800	2850
5	6000	4900	3670
6	7150	6000	4500
7	8150	7200	5320
8	9310	8400	6160
9	10500	9400	7020

(Again, a Reminder Note: All Voting Distribution illustrations are based on <u>current 2021</u> Membership Count Data. Actual voting distribution and thresholds will change based on future Membership Count numbers.)